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Phasing out coal requires expanding the notion of a ‘just transition’ and a roadmap which specifies 25 
the sequence of coal plant retirement, the appropriate policy instruments as well as ways to 26 
include key stakeholders in the process. 27 
Despite decades of knowledge about its contribution to climate change, coal combustion accounts 28 
for 40% of global CO2 emissions from energy use. The power sector must stop using coal without 29 
carbon capture-and-storage by about 2050, if the Paris Agreement climate goals are to be achieved.1 30 
This will not come easy. Globally, the coal mining industry alone employs about 8 million people and 31 
creates revenues of more than USD 900 billion a year.2 While growth in coal investments is slowing 32 
and COVID-19 induced electricity demand reductions have cut coal fired electricity output in 2020, 33 
coal use is unlikely to decline substantially in the medium term. Reductions in the United States and 34 
Europe are offset by growth in China, India and other Asian countries3,4, thus locking in future 35 





Figure 1:  Coal-fired power plants in the pipeline (planned, announced or under construction) as well as changes relative to 41 
2015 (ref 6). Percentage changes denote changes in the total pipeline between 2015 and 2019. 42 
 43 
Still, the urgency of climate change action demands the world to reduce coal use without carbon 44 
capture and storage quickly, and cease it over coming decades7. Yet, focusing on the environmental 45 
and health related externalities8,9 of coal combustion will likely not be sufficient to phase out coal. 46 
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Rather, it will be crucial that the coal phase out is seen as fair and that the process corresponds to 47 
political realities. Policy makers need to understand in more detail who will be affected by a 48 
transition away from coal, how these societal groups can be effectively compensated and how 49 
powerful vested interests can be counterbalanced.  50 
Expanding the notion of just transition 51 
It is understood that a coal phase out can only succeed if it takes into account social objectives and 52 
priorities. The necessity of a ‘just transition’ is widely acknowledged (Box 1). Such dialogue typically 53 
emphasizes employment creation, but often fails to include considerations related to i) regional 54 
economic development, ii) effects of higher energy prices for consumers and energy-intensive 55 
industries, or iii) how just transitions dynamics may cascade beyond individual countries10. Hence, 56 
what is needed is a just and feasible transition providing decent work and quality jobs as well as 57 
regional economic futures, while at the same time limiting adverse impacts on consumers and 58 
energy-intensive industries. 59 
 60 
Box 1: The just transition to date 61 
The concept of ‘just transition’ goes back to the 1990s. It was coined by trade unions to 
support social assistance programs for workers who lost their jobs as a result of environmental 
policies.11 In the climate policy discussion, its importance has been recognized in the preamble 
of the Paris Agreement, which calls for “[t]aking into account  the imperatives of a just 
transition of  the workforce and the creation of decent work and quality jobs” (p.2 in ref12), and 
the ‘Solidarity and Just Transition Silesia Declaration’13 adopted in 2018 at the 24th UN climate 
conference in Katowice, Poland. To date, there are a multitude of national commissions, 
policies, or task forces in place, including Canada, China, Czech Republic, Germany, Ghana, 
Indonesia, New Zealand, South Africa, Spain, the United States and Vietnam. A just transition is 
also backed by powerful coalitions and groups such as the International Trade Union 
Confederation (ITUC) and the International Labour Organization (ILO). We agree with calls to 
expand the notion of just transitions, to also reflect the potential negative effects of energy 
transitions on households and consumers, industry and regional development14,15.  
 62 
Regional economic futures 63 
While the environmental and health effects of coal are well understood, policy makers in newly 64 
industrializing countries often highlight the importance of coal for industrial development in specific 65 
regions16. Planning for alternative regional economic futures to substitute for coal requires a clearer 66 
understanding of the upstream and downstream links of coal mining and coal-fired power generation 67 
to the broader economy. Such plans could include the provision of transport and communication 68 
infrastructure, investment in higher education to attract human capital and new business 69 
opportunities, as well as the relocation of government services.  70 
Impacts on consumers and energy-intensive industries  71 
Renewing energy supply systems can increase electricity system cost, for example where depreciated 72 
coal plants produce at lower costs than new alternative power generation assets. It is then a 73 
question of social equity to shield the poor from electricity price increases. This can be achieved by 74 
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adjusting electricity tariffs, raising social spending or subsidizing energy efficiency, depending on the 75 
given institutional and political context.  76 
Foregoing coal could also affect the competitiveness of industries such as steel, aluminum, 77 
chemicals, and other important components of industrial strategy. This might raise the risk of ‘carbon 78 
leakage’, i.e. the migration of energy-intensive industries to regions with laxer climate measures, 79 
thus undermining the benefits for the climate and make coal phase-outs politically more difficult. 80 
More fine-grained projections of leakage risks in different sectors under a wide range of scenarios 81 
are required to explore which policy instruments can effectively reduce leakage. Options include 82 
coordinated implementation of emission reductions among different countries, the free allocation of 83 
permits within emissions trading schemes, border carbon adjustments, carbon contracts for 84 
difference, and mechanisms of technology transfer.17 85 
Expanding the feasibility space for phasing out coal 86 
The coal industry typically is a powerful stakeholder with vested interests in delaying coal phase-out.  87 
Strategies to overcome the influence of vested interests might include government payments for 88 
coal power plants that are being closed. In Germany, for example, the government agreed in early 89 
2020 on a set of measures to phase out coal by 2038 with additional costs of € 70 to 90 billion, 90 
including € 4.35 billion to operators of (lignite) coal-fired power plants that in turn shut down their 91 
plants early, i.e. before 2030. More cost-efficient alternatives that could be assessed include 92 
accelerated carbon pricing or industry-internal schemes whereby remaining power stations pay out 93 
plants that are retiring ahead of their end of economic life.18 In addition, the interests of alternative 94 
energy producers can be leveraged to help build coalitions that create support for coal phase-out 95 
that partially offsets the opposition of those losing out19,20.  96 
A roadmap to phase out coal in practice 97 
A viable coal phase-out strategy will need to avoid that new coal-fired power plants are built. This 98 
prevents locking in long-lived assets and is usually politically easier to achieve than closing existing 99 
plants early. In many cases expanding power supply through sources other than coal, i.e. renewables 100 
or natural gas, is cost effective, even before considering the environmental and health costs of coal 101 
use.  This will increasingly be the case as the cost of renewable energy technologies continues to fall. 102 
Nevertheless, there are factors that tend to favor continued investment in coal assets, including the 103 
security of supply in regions with abundant coal resources, the desire to protect jobs in the coal 104 
sector and in regional areas of coal production, dependence of public budgets on royalties from coal 105 
mining, as well as political influence of owners of coal mines and power producers.  106 
Coal phase-outs therefore require roadmaps based on a clear understanding of which plants are to 107 
be phased out when, which policies can be applied and how affected stakeholders can be included in 108 
the process. 109 
Sequence phase-outs  110 
The age profile of coal power plants differs greatly between countries. Industrialized countries 111 
typically built up a large part of their power infrastructure before 1990, whereas India, China and 112 
many other industrializing countries ramped up coal use in the last 15 to 30 years1 (Economic logic 113 
suggests that relatively old, and typically less efficient, plants often found in developed countries 114 
should be decommissioned first. Other factors to consider are the public health impacts of associated 115 
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air pollution and water use in densely populated areas. A realistic sequence of power plant closure 116 
will also need to take into account political and institutional constraints.  117 
A nuanced understanding of the associated political barriers as well as feasible no-lose options can 118 
help to identify countries and regions where policy action in the near term is more likely than in. 119 
Choosing the right instruments 120 
Coal producers and consumers need to understand the real costs of coal, including local health 121 
damages and climate consequences for the climate. Removing any existing coal subsidies would be a 122 
step to creating a level playing field for clean energy sources to compete. Some jurisdictions may 123 
want to impose an additional carbon cost on coal plants to accelerate coal phase-out. To be socially 124 
equitable and politically acceptable, a carbon price could raise funds in support of affected workers, 125 
communities and consumers. It  may be usefully embedded within a broader reform to the tax 126 
system geared to assist low-income households.21  127 
In addition, central banks and financial regulators need to include the climate and financial risks 128 
associated with coal assets in the prudential management of banks, insurers and institutional 129 
investors.22 Transparent disclosure of exposure to financial risks of climate policy could provide an 130 
important motivation for investors to reallocate assets away from coal.23 Financial investors 131 
increasingly decline to invest in coal-based assets already, because they are seen as high risk.24  132 
Stakeholder involvement and communication 133 
Efforts to phase out coal will only succeed if stakeholders are involved early on in the decision 134 
process to ensure democratic legitimacy. This is particularly important in times in which populist 135 
parties increasingly depict climate change mitigation as project undertaken by the political elite 136 
against the interests of the broader population, and where well founded concerns about economic 137 
prosperity dominate public discourses. 138 
Different forms of public deliberation, such as stakeholder dialogues, just transition commissions, 139 
and citizen assemblies, reflect public opinion and could be apt to further agreement between 140 
different interests. This raises the question of how participants are selected, in which form and 141 
frequency discussions take place, how scientific knowledge is used as an input and how the results of 142 
public deliberation are used by policy-makers. Policy makers could adapt their communication 143 
strategies on coal phase-out for different audiences that highlight the key benefits that align with 144 
individual concerns, , for instance emphasizing the importance of coal phase-out for climate change 145 
mitigation for one social group, and the more localized benefits of reduced air pollution for others. 146 
How to phase out coal 147 
To achieve internationally agreed climate targets, the world will need to phase out coal rapidly and 148 
immediately. This may be politically even more difficult in the altered political and economic 149 
landscape after the coronavirus pandemic. Roadmaps for coal phase out, smart use of a combination 150 
of policy instruments and effective integration of powerful stakeholders into the process are key to 151 
success.  152 
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